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The IEEE-SA Revised Patent Policy and 
Its Definition of “Reasonable” Rates: A 
Transatlantic Antitrust Divide? 
Nicolas Petit* 
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards As-
sociation’s (“IEEE-SA”) updated patent policy and a business review 
letter issued by the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) have 
caused much discussion in the United States. The purpose of this Article 
is to assess whether a similarly lenient antitrust approach to Standard 
Setting Organizations’ (“SSOs”) rate-setting policies would prevail 
under the European Union’s (“EU”) competition rules. Recent EU 
competition case law has promoted a very hard line in the area of coordi-
nated conduct. Cases such as Dole Food Company, Inc. v. European 
Commission, T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. Raad van bestuur van 
de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, and Expedia, Inc. v. Auto-
rité de la concurrence have expanded the scope of the per se prohibition 
rule found in article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union (“TFEU”) to forms of horizontal coordination with less 
than obvious anticompetitive potential, such as “cheap-talk” pre-pricing 
communication (Dole Food Company), episodic collusion (T-Mobile), 
and horizontal agreements with limited market coverage (Expedia). 
Those judgments, and others, share a common rationale—that of deter-
ring any coordinated interference with the price system. In the EU 
courts’ view, joint interference by competitors with the price system seems 
to be a sin in itself, regardless of actual or potential market effects. Hori-
zontal coordination is thus increasingly prohibited on its incipiency, and 
punished as a means to set an example. From an enforcement stand-
point, this trend in the case law has pros (lower enforcement costs) and 
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cons (deters pro-competitive coordination). But, perhaps more impor-
tantly, it has a major normative implication, which is that it raises the 
antitrust risk for all forms of coordination, including arrangements of 
the type found in the IEEE-SA updated patent policy. This Article ex-
plains that the antitrust risk generated by SSOs rate-setting policies is 
presumably higher in the European Union than in the United States, 
where the case law on horizontal coordination is less stringent. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article offers a preliminary assessment of the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association’s 
(“IEEE-SA”) revised patent policy under European Union 
(“EU”) antitrust law and, in particular, under the rules prohibiting 
unlawful anticompetitive coordination provided in article 101 of the 
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Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).1 In 
February 2015, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 
issued a business review letter (“BRL”), which concluded that the 
IEEE-SA revised patent policy did not deserve a challenge under 
the United States’ antitrust rules, short of “likely harm to competi-
tion” and to the extent that its potential procompetitive benefits 
likely outweighed any possible harm.2 This Article argues that a 
similar degree of forbearance might not have been possible if the 
analysis of the sections of the IEEE-SA revised patent policy re-
lated to the definition of “reasonable rates” had been conducted 
under EU competition law. This is because the case law of EU 
courts attaches cartel-type liability under TFEU article 101 to any 
coordinated interference with the price system, and this creates a 
risk of antitrust liability for licensing guidelines of the kind set out 
in the IEEE-SA revised patent policy.  
To be clear, this Article does not argue that the IEEE-SA re-
vised patent policy falls foul of TFEU article 101 as a possible form 
of horizontal buyer collusion, as previously argued by some au-
thors,3 but instead that it may plausibly give rise to EU antitrust 
exposure on the mere ground that it interferes with the free market 
price system. This Article then proceeds to explore the reasons 
that underpin the strict liability standard which prevails in EU 
competition law. It finds that the incipiency theory provides a poss-
ible ex post rationalization for the affirmation of cartel-type liability 
under TFEU article 101 for coordinated interferences with the 
price system. The Article concludes by arguing that antitrust agen-
cies’ invitations to Standard Setting Organizations (“SSOs”) to 
adopt rules designed to rein in the alleged market power of stan-
dard-essential patent (“SEP”) holders through private ordering 
                                                                                                                            
1 See IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws: Approved Clause 6 of the SASB Bylaws, IEEE 
STANDARDS ASS’N, https://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/approved-
changes.pdf [https://perma.cc/2S6M-ME4D] (last visited Nov. 19, 2016). 
2 See Letter from Renata B. Hesse, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Michael A. Lindsay, Esq., Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Feb. 2, 2015) [hereinafter BRL] (on 
file with the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal). 
3 See J. Gregory Sidak, The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of Standard-Essential 
Patents, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 48, 56–60 (2015) [hereinafter Sidak, Antitrust Division]. See 
generally J. Gregory Sidak, Patent Holdup and Oligopsonistic Collusion in Standard-Setting 
Organizations, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON 123 (2009). 
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mechanisms may eventually bring them within the strictures of 
TFEU article 101, thereby creating an antitrust trap. 
To show this, the Article proceeds in three steps. Part I de-
scribes the changes introduced by the IEEE-SA revised patent pol-
icy in relation to the definition and calculation of “reasonable 
rates.” Part II reviews EU case law under TFEU article 101, and 
demonstrates that the EU courts have progressively elaborated a 
strict rule of liability that outlaws any coordinated interferences 
with the price system. Part III explains that the inimicality toward 
coordinated interference with the price system observed in the case 
law may be rationalized on the basis of the “incipiency theory.” 
Finally, Part IV concludes that private ordering institutions like 
SSOs have less margin of maneuver under EU competition law to 
remedy perceived concerns of patent holdup than what the BRL 
suggests is the case under U.S. antitrust law. 
At this stage, some qualifications are in order. This Article only 
covers the changes introduced by the IEEE-SA revised patent poli-
cy in relation to the concept of “reasonable rates.” It does not dis-
cuss other changes introduced by the IEEE-SA revised patent poli-
cy, such as restrictions on the availability of prohibitive orders, du-
ty to license at all levels of production, rules on reciprocity, and 
grant backs. Moreover, the Article does not investigate the allega-
tions of collusive conduct that were leveled at some members of 
IEEE-SA during the process that led to the development of the re-
vised patent policy. 
From a methodological standpoint, the analysis is primarily 
conducted on the basis of the case law of the Court of Justice of the 
EU (“CJEU”) and the General Court (“GC”). The Article delibe-
rately leaves aside the policy documents and soft law instruments 
adopted by the European Commission (“the Commission”) in this 
field. There are two reasons for this conservative approach. First, 
the judgments of the EU courts in Expedia, Inc. v. Autorité de la con-
currence,  and Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencerådet (“Post Dan-
mark II”) have emphasized the inability of Commission soft law 
instruments to have binding effects on third parties, courts, and 
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agencies.4 Second, the formal and substantive validity of those in-
struments has not been tested before the EU Courts, and they can 
therefore not be deemed to provide a definitive and authoritative 
interpretation of the EU competition rules. 
I. REASONABLE RATES UNDER THE IEEE-SA REVISED 
PATENT POLICY 
A. Overview of the IEEE-SA Revised Patent Policy 
In the past decade, several important SSOs active in informa-
tion technologies have internally discussed changes to their patent 
policies.5 Within those SSOs, the demand for patent policy reform 
invariably originates from participants who are net technology buy-
ers, and are based on concerns of alleged patent “holdup” by other 
SSO participants who are net technology sellers.6  Calls for SSOs to 
take action against such perceived evils have also been fueled by 
external declarations from two of the world’s most influential anti-
trust agencies—the U.S. DOJ and the Commission7—who seem to 
                                                                                                                            
4 Case C-23/14, Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencerådet, ¶ 52 (Oct. 6, 2015), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=169191&pageIndex=
0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=54286 [https://perma.cc/8LPJ-
WCTJ]; Case C-226/11, Expedia, Inc. v. Autorité de la concurrence, ¶¶ 4, 12 (Dec. 13, 
2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=131804& 
pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=54095 [https:// 
perma.cc/42YR-BHU9]. 
5 The issue has also been discussed within other SSOs active in the wireless 
communications industries, like the International Telecommunications Union (“ITU”) 
and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (“ETSI”). To date, no other 
SSO has yet introduced changes similar to those found in IEEE-SA revised patent policy. 
6 The idea is that SEP holders use threats of injunctions to force firms to pay more. 
This theory can be traced back to Mark A. Lemley and Carl Shapiro. See generally Mark 
A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 
(2007); Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
280 (2010). 
7 See Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Six “Small” 
Proposals for SSOs Before Lunch, Remarks as Prepared for the ITU-T Patent Roundtable 
9–10 (Oct. 10, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518951/download [https:// 
perma.cc/34KF-5JJJ]. In Europe, see Information Note from the Eur. Comm’n Enter. & 
Indus. Directorate-Gen., to the Member States Standardisation Comm. 3 (Oct. 7, 2014) 
(on file with the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal). 
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have accepted the patent holdup theory.8 Proposals for SSO reform 
have generally consisted of spelling out in further detail the impli-
cations of Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory (“FRAND”) 
commitments made by SEP holders.9 FRAND commitments are 
voluntary, irrevocable assurances given by standard participants 
that they are prepared to grant licenses on fair, reasonable, and 
non-discriminatory terms for their patents that become essential to 
the implementation of a standard.10 
In this context, the IEEE-SA has been a pioneer. The IEEE-SA 
is one of the world’s largest SSOs.11 It operates in the electrical and 
information technologies sectors, and it is well known for the suc-
cessful introduction of several cutting-edge wireless communica-
tions standards, including IEEE 802.11 (better known as Wi-Fi).12 
                                                                                                                            
8 Further, they have waved the red scarf of antitrust intervention against SEP holders 
as an exceptional, last resort perspective. See, e.g., Joaquín Almunia, Vice President of 
Eur. Comm’n Responsible for Competition Policy, Address at the IP Summit: Intellectual 
Property and Competition Policy (Dec. 9, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-13-1042_en.htm [https://perma.cc/F7P6-FTKY]. The speech 
discussed the need to take action to remove injunctions when there is a willing licensee: 
“Ideally, this principle should be implemented by the standard-setting [organizations] 
themselves. But since that is not happening, I am willing to provide clarity to the market 
through competition enforcement.” Id. 
9 This includes limiting their fundamental right to seek injunctive relief. 
10 For a definition, see ETSI Rules of Procedure: Annex 6: ETSI Intellectual Property 
Rights Policy, EUR. TELECOMM. STANDARDS INST. ¶ 6.1 (Apr. 20, 2016), http:// 
www.etsi.org/images/files/ipr/etsi-ipr-policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQW4-5GHH]. 
11 IEEE-SA has members from more than 160 countries, including members from 
corporations, government agencies, and academic institutions. See IEEE at a Glance, 
INST. ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS, https://www.ieee.org/about/today/ 
at_a_glance.html [https://perma.cc/U8MN-6U6S] (last visited Nov. 19, 2016). 
12 Id. Within the IEEE-SA, individual technical committees (also known as working 
groups) develop industrial standards, which are then subject to ballot approval by the 
IEEE-SA Standards Board. See How Are Standards Made?, IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N, 
http://standards.ieee.org/develop/process.html [https://perma.cc/FVJ3-MFXX] (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2016). One of the groups is the IEEE 802 LAN/MAN Standards 
Committee, which presents itself as the world leader standard development body in 
wireless communications technologies. See IEEE 802 LAN/MAN STANDARDS 
COMMITTEE, http://www.ieee802.org [https://perma.cc/3CF5-VYSL] (last Nov. 19, 
2016). For general information about IEEE 802, see Roger B. Marks, Ian C. Gifford & 
Bob O’Hara, Standards in IEEE 802 Unleash the Wireless Internet, 2 IEEE MICROWAVE 
MAG. 46 (2001), http://www.ieee802.org/16/docs/01/80216c-01_10.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/2EE5-PDCL]. Further, the IEEE-SA Standards Board is assisted by a Patent 
Committee (“PatCom”), which, in particular, receives, considers, and accepts FRAND 
Letters of Assurances (“LOAs”). See IEEE-SA Records of IEEE Standards-Related Patent 
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On February 8, 2015, the IEEE-SA announced an update of its 
patent policy.13 The revised patent policy’s stated aim is to provide 
“[g]reater [c]larity of [m]eaning on ‘[r]easonable’ [r]ate[s],”14  fol-
lowing unsuccessful previous attempts to reduce the “inherent va-
gueness” of FRAND commitments given by SEP holders.15 Read-
ers familiar with the field will recall that, in 2007, the IEEE-SA 
tried to address the issue by adopting a patent policy that expressly 
permitted a patent holder to disclose its proposed maximum rates 
and other terms in a Letter of Assurances (“LOA”). In practice, 
the experience under the 2007 policy was a failure.16 The IEEE-SA 
                                                                                                                            
Letters of Assurance, IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD: PATCOM, https://standards.ieee.org/ 
about/sasb/patcom/patents.html [https://perma.cc/5VWG-XJQT] (last visited Nov. 19, 
2016). PatCom is also in charge of proposing changes to the IEEE patent policy. Id. 
13 On December 6, 2014, the IEEE Board of Directors approved revisions to section 6 
of the IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws. See IEEE Statement Regarding Updating of Its 
Standards-Related Patent Policy, INST. ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS (Feb. 8, 
2015), https://www.ieee.org/about/news/2015/8_february_2015.html [https:// 
perma.cc/B2T7-PQAL] [hereinafter IEEE Statement]. Those changes took effect on 
March 15, 2015. See Understanding Patent Issues During IEEE Standards Development, 
IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N 22 (Sept. 1, 2015), http://standards.ieee.org/faqs/patents.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/428S-TMLS] [hereinafter Understanding Patent Issues]. 
14 See Letter from Michael A. Lindsay, Esq., Dorsey & Whitney LLP, to William J. 
Baer, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 15 (Sept. 30, 2014) [hereinafter 
Request] (on file with the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law 
Journal). In addition to providing guidance on the meaning of “reasonable rate,” the 
updated patent policy: (i) clarifies that compliant implementations cover both end-use 
products and components or sub-assemblies, and that FRAND commitment indistinctly 
apply to all; (ii) restricts the availability of injunction or exclusion orders to patent holders 
to circumstances where the implementer fails to comply with the outcome of third-party 
judicial proceedings over FRAND-setting disputes, invalidity, enforceability, essentiality 
and infringement, and damages; and (iii) confirms that SEP holders can seek to benefit 
from grant backs on the licensee’s SEPs and non-SEPs. See IEEE-SA Standards Board 
Bylaws, supra note 1. 
15 Request, supra note 14, at 10; see also Konstantinos Karachalios, Managing Dir., 
IEEE Standards Ass’n, Keynote Address at IEEE SIIT: “If It Works (For Me), Why Fix 
It?” Status Quo Versus Reforms at the Intersection Between the Patent System and 
Standardization (Oct. 6, 2015). The address described the problem with the FRAND 
commitment concept: “To be clear, the problem is not the relative ambiguity of an 
incomplete contract, since most useful contracts include several levels and degrees of 
ambiguity. It is the total ambiguity of the basic definitions that makes such a contract 
totally vague and, thus, potentially tricky for the ones lured in it.” Id. 
16 This seems recognized even by proponents of such policies. See, e.g., Konstantinos 
Karachalios Fundamental Uncertainty at the Intersection Between Patents and Standards, 
PATENT LAWYER, Nov.–Dec. 2015, at 33. 
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only received two LOAs in which patent holders accepted to dis-
close maximum rates.17 
The 2015 revised patent policy has more teeth. It introduces a 
definition of a “reasonable rate” that applies to all patent holders 
that make an early FRAND commitment in an accepted LOA.18  
Under the adopted definition, reasonable rate means “appropriate 
compensation to the patent holder for the practice of an Essential 
Patent Claim excluding the value, if any, resulting from the inclu-
sion of that Essential Patent Claim’s technology in the IEEE stan-
dard.”19 In other words, an SEP holder that makes a FRAND dec-
laration commits that it will not charge royalties up to the value 
implementers would incur to switch technologies.20 The definition 
of a “reasonable rate” is mandatory in the sense that it applies to 
all essential patent claims for which the IEEE-SA has an accepted 
LOA. It is, however, not mandatory in the sense that patent hold-
ers can still avoid to give a FRAND commitment and nonetheless 
participate in the standard-setting activities of IEEE-SA.21 
In addition, the IEEE-SA updated patent policy recommends 
the consideration of three “factors” in the determination of rea-
sonable rates during licensing negotiations.22 Under the first factor, 
the rate should reflect the value contributed by the SEP-protected 
invention to the “value of the relevant functionality of the smallest 
saleable compliant implementation” of the SEP.23 According to the 
BRL, this factor is designed to ensure that the royalty correctly re-
flects the added value of the patented invention, and nothing 
more.24 It would prevent SEP holders from free riding on other end 
product features to extract unreasonable royalties, which might oc-
                                                                                                                            
17 See Request, supra note 14, at 10. 
18 See IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, supra note 1, at 2. 
19 Id. 
20 See Understanding Patent Issues, supra note 13, at 13 (“A Reasonable Rate does not 
include value arising from the cost or inability of implementers to switch from the 
Essential Patent Claim’s technology included in the standard.”). 
21 See IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, supra note 1, at 2. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 See BRL, supra note 2, at 12–13. It is also often referred to as the smallest saleable 
patent-practicing unit (“SSPU”) requirement. 
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cur when the end product is complex and runs on many patented 
technologies.25 
Under the second factor, account shall be given to the relative 
value contributed by the SEP to the smallest saleable compliant 
implementation “in light of the value contributed by all Essential 
Patent Claims for the same IEEE Standard practiced in that Com-
pliant Implementation.”26 The stated rationale behind the second 
factor is to mitigate “royalty stacking” risks, when SEP holders fail 
to consider the adverse cumulative effect of their royalty demands 
on the aggregate price for the standardized technology.27 
Finally, the third factor recommends considering “[e]xisting li-
censes covering use of the same Essential Patent Claim,” provided 
they are “comparable” and were not obtained under the “threat of 
a Prohibitive Order.”28 Possible benchmarks include licensing 
terms entered into following voluntary negotiations or granted by 
courts in the context of assessing damages during litigation.29 
A degree of ambiguity persists on the binding nature of the 
three factors articulated in the IEEE-SA updated patent policy. On 
the one hand, the text emphatically prescribes that the “determina-
tion of reasonable rates should include, but need not be limited to, 
the consideration of” the three factors identified, suggesting that 
they constitute a core set of pricing rules.30 On the other hand, the 
Frequently Asked Questions (“FAQs”) issued by the IEEE-SA 
explain that the revised patent policy simply “recommends” but 
does not require the consideration of the three factors, suggesting 
that they constitute mere pricing guidelines.31 The remainder of 
this Article relies on the latter reading in view of the fact that an 
SEP holder that is unwilling to submit a FRAND commitment can 
nonetheless continue to participate in IEEE-SA standards devel-
                                                                                                                            
25 Id. at 12. This is without, however, excluding the possibility of charging royalties 
expressed in terms of a share of the end-product price (end-product royalties). 
26 See IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, supra note 1, at 2. 
27 See BRL, supra note 2, at 13. 
28 See IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, supra note 1, at 2. 
29 See BRL, supra note 2, at 13 n.48. 
30 See IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, supra note 1, at 2. 
31 See Understanding Patent Issues, supra note 13, at 15 (“While the IEEE-SA Patent 
Policy recommends considerations for use in determining a Reasonable Rate, these 
considerations are not mandatory.”); see also Request, supra note 14, at 18. 
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opment activities.32 That said, it is obvious that the former reading 
of the patent policy would have even more serious implications 
from an antitrust standpoint than the ones described in later sec-
tions. 
B. Development of the IEEE-SA Revised Patent Policy and the DOJ 
Business Review Letter 
The process that led to the adoption of the IEEE-SA revised 
patent policy was both protracted and controversial.33 Four drafts 
of the updated patent policy were published for public review and 
comment.34 A flood of comments was received.35 The definition 
and calculation of reasonable rates proved particularly contentious. 
A debate occurred between technology developing firms, desirous 
to maintain flexibility in ex post licensing negotiations, and tech-
nology implementing firms, intent on limiting ex ante the bargain-
ing power of SEP holders through a stricter definition of 
FRAND.36 In most consensus-driven SSOs, such a divide would 
have been fatal to the proposed policy changes. However, a distin-
guishing feature of IEEE-SA is that it appears to be able to adopt 
such modifications under majority vote. In August 2014, the IEEE-
SA Standards Board eventually adopted the updated version fol-
lowing a fourteen-to-five vote.37 
In the course of its development, the revised patent policy gave 
rise to possible concerns of antitrust liability.38 Communications 
                                                                                                                            
32 See Understanding Patent Issues, supra note 13, at 9 (stating that submitting a LOA is 
“not a precondition to participation”). 
33 For a comprehensive description, see Nicolo Zingales & Olia Kanevskaia, The IEEE-
SA Patent Policy Update Under the Lens of EU Competition Law, EUR. COMPETITION J. 
(Nov. 23, 2016), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17441056.2016.1254482 
[https://perma.cc/4GAR-YKZD]. 
34 Id. at 18. 
35 Id. 
36 See David Crouch, Battle Over IP Rights Could Hold Back Next-Generation Technology, 
FIN. TIMES (June 11, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/30cfde18-ffa5-11e4-bc30-
00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/W5M3-QQ45]. 
37 See IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N, IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD MEETING MINUTES—
AUGUST 2014, http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/0814sasbmin.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/2KPA-YF4J]. 
38 See PATENT COMM. OF THE IEEE-SA STANDARDS BD., IEEE-SA PATENT POLICY—
19TH NOV 2013 DRAFT COMMENTS 18 (Mar. 4, 2014), http://grouper.ieee.org/ 
groups/pp-dialog/drafts_comments/PatCom_sort_by_commentID_040314.pdf 
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technology company Ericsson argued that the reasonable rate defi-
nition could lead to “the collective establishment of mandatory, 
uniform license terms that will reduce the compensation for stan-
dard essential patents, akin to a buyer’s side cartel.”39 In a letter to 
the DOJ,40 J. Gregory Sidak, a well-known antitrust scholar and 
consultant, expressed concerns that the proposed “amendments 
posed a serious risk of violating section 1 of the Sherman Act by 
facilitating tacit or explicit collusion among implementers to sup-
press the royalties they pay for SEPs.”41 
Arguably to appease those concerns, the IEEE-SA requested a 
BRL from the DOJ.42  On February 2, 2015, the DOJ officially 
stated in a BRL that it had no intention to challenge the IEEE-SA 
revised patent policy under the antitrust rules.43 The DOJ’s BRL is 
a succinct policy statement that is relatively devoid of analytical 
content. The exercise conducted by the DOJ essentially consisted 
in assessing whether the revised patent policy would “harm com-
petition by anticompetitively reducing royalties and thereby dimi-
nishing incentives to innovate.”44 Two general considerations 
seem to underpin the DOJ’s decision to dismiss antitrust charges. 
First, the DOJ observed that the IEEE-SA revised policy could not 
have any bearing on the setting of royalty rates which “ultimately 
are determined through bilateral negotiations.”45 Second, the DOJ 
stressed that both the definition of reasonable rates and the three 
pricing factors remain optional.46 It insisted, in particular, on the 
                                                                                                                            
[https://perma.cc/3F3H-BSH4] [hereinafter IEEE-SA DRAFT COMMENTS]; see also Ron 
D. Katznelson, IEEE-USA Intellectual Prop. Comm., Presentation at IEEE San Diego 
Section: Will New IEEE Standards Incorporate Patented Technologies Under the 
Proposed Patent Policy? (Dec. 23, 2014), http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
filename=0&article=1091&context=rkatznelson&type=additional [https://perma.cc/ 
BP2S-TNLP]. 
39 IEEE-SA DRAFT COMMENTS, supra note 38, at 15–16. This comment was made by 
D. Kallay of Ericsson in the context of discussing retroactive application. Id. 
40 Letter from J. Gregory Sidak, Chairman, Criterion Economics LLC, to Renata 
Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 28, 2015) (on file with 
the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal). 
41 See Sidak, Antitrust Division, supra note 3, at 51. 
42 See Request, supra note 14, at 1. 
43 See BRL, supra note 2, at 1. 
44 Id. at 8. 
45 Id. 
46 See id. at 11–12. 
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fact that “patent holders can avoid the updated IEEE RAND 
Commitment and still participate in standards-setting activities at 
IEEE-SA.”47 
In a section specifically dedicated to the IEEE-SA definition of 
“reasonable rates,” the BRL considered possible justifications for 
the revised patent policy.48 It noted that the mandatory definition 
reduced the possibility that SEP holders will “hold up implemen-
ters of a standard and obtain higher prices . . . than would have 
been possible before the standard was set.”49 In relation to the 
three factors, the BRL cited a variety of patent—not antitrust—
case law references to denote that the revised patent policy is con-
sistent with judicial precedent.50 The DOJ concluded its BRL on an 
optimistic note, stating that the IEEE-SA revised patent policy will 
“benefit competition and consumers by facilitating licensing nego-
tiations, mitigating hold up and royalty stacking, and promoting 
competition among technologies for inclusion in standards.”51 
The adoption of the BRL has not extinguished the controversy 
surrounding the IEEE-SA revised patent policy—much to the con-
trary. Technology developing firms with significant patent posi-
tions have complained that the IEEE-SA revised patent policy is 
skewed toward technology implementers,52 and firms have threat-
                                                                                                                            
47 Id. at 8. This particular point is the subject of dispute. While the IEEE-SA has 
submitted to the DOJ that the changes could be bypassed, the IEEE-SA has continued to 
label them as a “clarification” of its patent policy, which tends to suggest that they are 
mandatory. See generally Request, supra note 14. The technology firm InterDigital has 
criticized this confusion, and suggested that this could lead to the inapplicability of the 
DOJ’s business review letter. See Letter from Lawrence F. Shay, Exec. Vice President, 
Intellectual Prop., InterDigital, to David Law, Patent Comm. Chair, IEEE-SA Standards 
Board Patent Comm. 2 (Mar. 24, 2015) [hereinafter InterDigital Letter] (on file with the 
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal). 
48 See BRL, supra note 2, at 11–14. 
49 Id. at 12. 
50 Id. at 11–12. 
51 Id. at 16. 
52 This has been confirmed by a subsequent econometric analysis carried out by Sidak, 
which “reveals a biased treatment of substantive comments submitted to the IEEE by 
members opposed to the controversial revisions.” See J. Gregory Sidak, Testing for Bias to 
Suppress Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 1 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 301, 303 
(2016). According to Sidak, this “bias suggests that [decision-making] at the IEEE was 
controlled by parties that seek to devalue SEPs.” Id. 
2017] IEEE-SA  REVISED PATENT POLICY 223 
 
ened to reconsider their participation in the IEEE-SA under the 
revised patent policy.53 
Some scholars have also leveled trenchant critiques at the BRL. 
Sidak argued that the DOJ has applied a “laxer standard to the risk 
of collusion over the prices that buyers will pay for SEPs” than the 
standard usually applied “over the prices that the very same buyers 
will pay for other kinds of essential inputs.”54 Legal scholars Tho-
mas A. Lambert and Alden F. Abbott analogized the IEEE-SA re-
vised patent policy to an “illegal monopsony buyer cartel,” and 
decried the DOJ’s policy under the BRL as “perverse antitrust pol-
icy” which “threatens to raise Type II error costs.”55 
II. COORDINATED INTERFERENCE WITH THE PRICE SYSTEM 
AS A RESTRICTION BY OBJECT UNDER TFEU ARTICLE 101 
This Article submits that an antitrust agency would have 
reached a conclusion opposite to that reached by the DOJ had it 
conducted its analysis under EU antitrust standards. SSOs’ at-
tempts to clarify the concept of “reasonable rates” are likely to 
give rise to antitrust liability under TFEU article 101 without the 
need to adduce further facts. The basis for this contention is that, 
through the years, the case law handed down by the CJEU under 
TFEU article 101 has evolved to attach cartel-type antitrust liability 
to any coordinated interference with the free market price system. 
The following sections review this case law, explore its normative 
                                                                                                                            
53 Those companies include Nokia, Ericsson, Qualcomm, and InterDigital, among 
others. See Crouch, supra note 36; see also InterDigital Letter, supra note 47; Bill Merritt, 
Why We Disagree with the IEEE’s Patent Policy, EETIMES (Mar. 27, 2015, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.eetimes.com/author.asp?doc_id=1326144&section_id=36 [https:// 
perma.cc/KR53-NYH6] (“A handful of manufacturers of devices—the people who pay 
for the use of the technology—essentially co-opted the IEEE patent committee.”). 
54 See Sidak, Antitrust Division, supra note 3, at 69. Sidak draws a parallel with the 
Silicon Valley buyer cartel in United States v. Adobe Systems, Inc., which was deemed a per 
se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 70 (citing No. 10-CV-1629, 2011 WL 
10883994 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2011)). In his view, the sole difference between a buyer cartel 
on labor and a buyer cartel on SEPs is that the former will create deadweight loss in the 
short term, while the later will reduce output in the long term. Id. at 71–72. 
55 See Thomas A. Lambert & Alden F. Abbott, Recognizing the Limits of Antitrust: The 
Roberts Court Versus the Enforcement Agencies, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 791, 840–41 
(2015). 
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implications, and discuss its application to the IEEE-SA revised 
patent policy. 
Admittedly, the case law is not specific to SSOs, let alone to pa-
tents and intellectual property (“IP”) rights. Yet, given that EU 
antitrust law observes the general principle of symmetry—
according to which antitrust law treats intellectual property as it 
treats any other form of property56—there is no reason to segregate 
SSO patent policies from the application of this body of cases. The 
existence of specific agency guidelines on the matter does not mod-
ify the assessment. 
A. EU Courts’ Case Law 
EU antitrust law goes well beyond treating only horizontal 
price-fixing as brazen violations of TFEU article 101. It is a widely 
known state of affairs—and one often criticized in legal academia 
and practice—that the first paragraph of TFEU article 101 catches 
as restrictions “by object” (the legal equivalent of a per se in-
fringement in U.S. antitrust law) many less patently anticompeti-
tive forms of collusion.57 What may be less well understood, how-
ever, is that the CJEU case law generally considers any coordinated 
conduct that interferes with the pricing system as a restriction by 
object.58 Within the copious amount of CJEU case law on horizon-
tal coordination, five cases are particularly relevant.59 
                                                                                                                            
56 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (1995) (“[F]or the purpose of antitrust 
analysis, the Agencies regard intellectual property as being essentially comparable to any 
other form of property.”). 
57 This includes various categories of exchange on strategic data. See Guidelines on the 
Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to 
Horizontal Co-Operation Agreements, 2011 O.J. (C 11) 1, ¶ 74 [hereinafter Guidelines on 
the Applicability of Article 101] (“Information exchanges between competitors of 
individuali[z]ed data regarding intended future prices or quantities should therefore be 
considered a restriction of competition by object.”). 
58 Id. ¶ 60. 
59 One of these cases is not a court case, but a Commission decision. This Article 
reviews it, nonetheless, because it is a transposition of an interesting GC judgment under 
TFEU article 102. 
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1. FEDETAB 
In Heintz van Landewyck SARL v. Commission of the European 
Communities (also known as “FEDETAB”), the board of a non-
profit trade association with oversight of ninety-five percent of to-
bacco production in Belgium issued a recommendation to regulate 
the wholesale and retail trades of cigarettes.60 The recommenda-
tion set out maximum discounts and minimum quantity require-
ments for cigarette distribution, uniform end-of-year rebates, and 
standardized terms of payment (cash and specific credit periods).61 
The Commission analyzed the recommendation as a restriction of 
competition by object and effect, and declared it contrary to article 
85 of the European Economic Community (“EEC”) Treaty,62 
which later became TFEU article 101.63 
On appeal before the CJEU, the applicants claimed that the 
recommendation was not binding and that it could not, therefore, 
possibly restrict competition.64 The court dismissed the allegation 
on the facts, and sided with the Commission’s finding that the rec-
ommendation operated as a “genuine mandatory rule of conduct” 
adopted by the major industry players sitting in FEDETAB’s 
board.65 What is more, the court suggested that the question of the 
formal mandatory nature of the recommendation was to some ex-
tent irrelevant.66 In the court’s view, as long as a substantial num-
ber of firms endorse the recommendation—the court wrote of 
“compliance with the recommendation”—then the recommenda-
tion can be deemed to have a “profound influence on competition 
in the market” and infringe TFEU article 101.67 
                                                                                                                            
60 See Joined Cases 209 to 215 & 218/78, Heintz van Landewyck SARL v. Comm’n, 
1980 E.C.R. 3125, 3134–35. 
61 See id. at 3138–39. 
62 See Case IV/28.852, 29.127, 29.149—Fedetab, Comm’n Decision, 1978 O.J. (L 224) 
29, ¶¶ 80–87. 
63 See ALISON JONES & BRENDA SUFRIN, EU COMPETITION LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND 
MATERIALS 105 (6th ed. 2016). 
64 See Joined Cases 209 to 215 & 218/78, Heintz van Landewyck SARL, at 3241–42. 
65 See id. at 3250–51. 
66 See id. at 3222. 
67 See id. at 3250–51. The court also described the parties in the case as firms “who 
control a substantial part of the total cigarette sales in Belgium.” Id. 
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2. SCK and FNK 
In the second case, Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf 
(SCK) and Federatie van Nederlandse Kraanbedrijven (FNK) v. 
Commission of the European Communities, Dutch firms that rent mo-
bile cranes to the construction, petrochemical, and transport indus-
tries set up a trade association and a certification body under the 
names SCK and FNK.68 At some point, FNK introduced a statuto-
ry requirement that its members charge “reasonable rates” for 
both external crane hiring transactions vis-à-vis clients and internal 
renting operations amongst members.69 In parallel, FNK sought to 
give guidance on the meaning of “reasonable rates” by issuing in-
ternal rates for transactions amongst crane hiring firms, and by 
publishing a handbook comprising cost calculations and recom-
mended rates for transactions with external clients.70 The general 
conditions established by FNK also contained conditions concern-
ing prices, such as minimum rental hours, higher rates for Sundays 
and holidays, and a prohibition of charging cancellation costs.71 
The case was scrutinized by the Commission, which suspected 
that the system operated as a facilitating device for horizontal col-
lusion.72 During the administrative proceedings, a discussion took 
place on the nature of the concept of “reasonable rates.”73 FNK 
argued that its members were entirely free “to interpret the con-
cept ‘reasonable.’”74 The Commission objected to this, noting that 
“the reasonability of rates was discussed between the crane-
[hiring] companies and FNK” and that “FNK members were ob-
                                                                                                                            
68 See Joined Cases T-213/95 & T-18/96, Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf 
(SCK) and Federatie van Nederlandse Kraanbedrijven (FNK) v. Comm’n, 1997 E.C.R. 
II-1739, ¶¶ 1, 4–5. 
69 See id. ¶ 4. In the mobile cranes sector, it is common for crane hiring firms to 
internally rent extra cranes from each other to serve clients, because this is more 
attractive than purchase. See id. ¶ 2. 
70 See id. ¶¶ 4, 23. 
71 See Case IV/34.179, 34.202, 216—Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf and the 
Federatie van Nederlandse Kraanverhuurbedrijven, Comm’n Decision, 1995 O.J. (L 312) 
79, ¶ 10. 
72 See id. ¶¶ 26–27. 
73 See id. ¶ 20. 
74 Id. 
2017] IEEE-SA  REVISED PATENT POLICY 227 
 
liged under . . . the internal rules to charge ‘reasonable’ rates.”75 
The Commission found that the “system of recommended and in-
ternal rates, which is intended to give substance to the concept of 
‘reasonable rates’” falls within the scope of TFEU article 
[101(1)].76 
The facts suggest that the Commission’s concerns were not 
with the requirement to set “reasonable rates.” Instead, its objec-
tions were to the mandatory measures taken to interpret the con-
cept of reasonable rates, including the fixing of rates at a level supe-
rior to market rates. 
On appeal, the parties challenged the Commission’s decision 
on the ground that the recommended and internal “rates were in-
tended to serve only as an aid to specific negotiations and had no 
binding force at all.”77 The GC dismissed the argument.78 It held 
that those rates which “give substance to the concept of reasonable 
rates” were “in fact a pricing system binding its members.”79 
Admittedly, SCK and FNK is a case that belongs to the hori-
zontal price-fixing genre. That said, it suggests that the risk of anti-
trust liability increases when a trade association seeks to give bind-
ing force and substance to “reasonable rates” requirements. 
3. Dole Food Company 
In Dole Food Company, Inc. v. European Commission, four 
worldwide producers of fresh fruit had coordinated their quotation 
prices for bananas exported to the European Union.80 The Com-
mission classified the infringement as a “cartel,” and imposed pe-
                                                                                                                            
75 Id. The Commission concluded that the claim that they were “‘completely free’ 
when setting their rates [was] therefore inaccurate.” Id. 
76 See id. 
77 See Joined Cases T-213/95 & T-18/96, Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf 
(SCK) and Federatie van Nederlandse Kraanbedrijven (FNK) v. Comm’n, 1997 E.C.R. 
II-1739, ¶ 152. 
78 Id. ¶ 157. 
79 Id. ¶ 159. In the case at hand, the court went on to consider other factors, which 
made the price system binding and akin to a “system of imposed prices.” See id. ¶ 164. 
80 Case COMP/39.188—Bananas, Comm’n Decision (Oct. 15, 2008) (Summary at 
2009 O.J. (C 189) 12), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/ 
39188/39188_2291_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3RL-CDWV]. 
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nalties totaling € 60.3 million (around $85 million at the time).81 
The decision was first appealed to the GC,82 and then to the 
CJEU.83 Both courts affirmed the Commission’s analysis in full 
and dismissed the appeals.84 
The theory of liability advanced in the Commission’s decision 
was that the parties had unlawfully entertained “bilateral pre-
pricing communications during which they discussed banana price 
setting factors, that is factors relevant for setting of quotation pric-
es for the upcoming week.”85 The problem, in the eyes of the 
Commission and of the courts, was that this coordination was de-
signed to “reduce uncertainty.”86 
On closer examination, the impugned conduct had several orig-
inal features. First, the case concerned quotation prices for bana-
nas, not transaction prices, which were subsequently determined 
through bilateral negotiations with customers.87 The Commission’s 
decision spoke, in that respect, of “pre-pricing communications.” 
Second, the parties were not engaged in discussions over quotation 
prices, but over quotation price trends and “price setting factors, 
that is factors relevant for setting of quotation prices.”88 Those 
somewhat uncommon features—namely, the remoteness of the 
conduct from market transactions and the abstract content of the 
topics discussed—did not dissuade the Commission from pursuing 
                                                                                                                            
81 Id. ¶¶ 51–92, 492. 
82 See Case T-588/08, Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Comm’n,  ¶ 2 (Mar. 14, 2013), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=134981&doclang=EN 
[https://perma.cc/5GJE-RFZR]. 
83 Case C-286/13 P, Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Comm’n, ¶ 1 (Mar. 19, 2015), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=163028&pageIndex=
0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=684009 [https://perma.cc/ 
NL9M-Y6K2]. 
84 See id. ¶¶ 1, 161. 
85 See Case COMP/39.188, Bananas, ¶ 51. 
86 See id. ¶ 54; C-286/13 P, Dole Food, ¶ 16. 
87 See Case COMP/39.188, Bananas, ¶ 115 (stating that “quotation prices served at 
least as market signals, trends and/or indications as to the intended development of 
banana prices, and that they were relevant for the banana trade and the prices obtained”). 
88 See id. ¶ 51; see also Case C-286/13 P, Dole Food, ¶ 14. In reality, the Commission 
objected to both (i) price-setting factors, “and (ii) price trends and indications of 
quotation prices for the forthcoming week before those quotation prices were set.” Id. 
¶ 96. 
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the case as a plain vanilla cartel, and qualifying the infringement as 
a “restriction by object.”89 
In their appeal before the CJEU, the parties challenged both 
aspects.90 Their first argument was that “the subjects to which the 
pre-pricing communications related was too general for it to be 
possible, on that basis, for them to determine with certainty the 
future conduct on the market.”91 They contended that “not all dis-
cussions concerning factors that might be relevant to price-setting 
are sufficiently deleterious to merit classification as a restriction of 
competition by object.”92 The CJEU disposed of the claim by hold-
ing that those communications “related to factors which had an 
influence on supply vis-à-vis demand, market conditions and price 
developments.”93 
The applicants also argued that pre-pricing communications on 
quotation price trends could not be deemed a restriction by object 
because “quotation prices were far removed from actual prices.”94 
The GC judgment had actually acknowledged that pre-pricing 
communications on price-setting factors like the weather were 
“innocuous.”95 The applicants thus argued that the mere fact that 
pre-pricing communications “might have a certain influence on 
prices is not sufficient to establish . . . restriction . . . by object.”96 
The court, again, rejected this view.97 While the court addressed 
the argument on quotation prices trends, insisting on their impor-
tant role in the formation of actual prices, the court did not proceed 
to explain the anticompetitive impact of communications on pre-
pricing factors.98 Instead, the court took a more principled ap-
                                                                                                                            
89 The case originated from a leniency application by Chiquita. See Case C-286/13 P, 
Dole Food, ¶ 5. 
90 Id. ¶¶ 86, 106. 
91 Id. ¶ 86. 
92 Id. ¶ 87. 
93 Id. ¶ 97. 
94 Id. ¶ 106. 
95 Id. ¶ 109. 
96 Id. ¶ 107. 
97 Id. ¶ 134. 
98 Id. ¶ 130 (“[Q]uotation prices were relevant to the market concerned, since, on the 
one hand, market signals, market trends or indications as to the intended development of 
banana prices could be inferred from those quotation prices, which were important for the 
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proach, affirming somewhat discretionarily that “the pre-pricing 
communications had the object of creating conditions of competi-
tion that do not correspond to the normal conditions on the market 
and therefore gave rise to a concerted practice having as its object 
the restriction of competition within the meaning of [TFEU article 
101].”99 
4. T-Mobile Netherlands 
In T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. Raad van bestuur van de Neder-
landse Mededingingsautoriteit, the five wireless communications op-
erators in the Netherlands had shared information over remunera-
tions paid to dealers.100 The case looked like a classic information 
exchange, with the significant difference that the conspirators had 
only met once to discuss dealers’ payments.101 The Dutch competi-
tion agency nonetheless issued fines.102 As the case progressed 
through the Dutch appeals system, a court considered that the fact 
that there had only been a “single meeting” called into question 
the applicability of the implementation presumption which holds 
that—in concerted practice cases where the burden of proof is dis-
charged on the basis of circumstantial evidence—the existence of 
an exchange of information can be presumed to influence the par-
ties’ conduct on the market.103 It thus referred the case to the 
CJEU, asking for clarification on whether the implementation pre-
sumption also applied in the case of an “isolated event,” or if, by 
contrast, “a certain degree of regularity over a lengthy period” was 
needed.104 The national court also sought to understand if an ex-
change of information which did not have the object of raising con-
                                                                                                                            
banana trade and the prices obtained and, on the other, in some transactions the actual 
prices were directly linked to the quotation prices.”). 
99 Id. ¶ 134. 
100 See Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Neth. BV v. Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit, 2009 E.C.R. I-04529, ¶¶ 10, 12–13. 
101 See id. ¶ 12. 
102 Id. ¶ 13. 
103 Id. ¶ 21. With this, agencies and courts that apply TFEU article 101 can dispense 
with an analysis of effects and dismiss defendants’ claims that their coordination was 
ineffective. See id. ¶ 30. 
104 Id. ¶ 22. 
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sumer prices could nevertheless be deemed a restriction by ob-
ject.105 
Unsurprisingly, the court’s answer to the second question was 
that “to find that a concerted practice has an anti-competitive ob-
ject, there does not need to be a direct link between that practice 
and consumer prices.”106 The wording of TFEU article 101 indeed 
accommodates as restrictions by object any coordination that “di-
rectly or indirectly fix[es] purchase or selling prices or any other 
trading conditions.”107 
Perhaps less evidently, the court reaffirmed the implementa-
tion presumption even when the concerted practice is “iso-
lated.”108 In the court’s view, it cannot be ruled out that a “meet-
ing on a single occasion” may constitute a sufficient basis to distort 
competition.109 The court then went on to explain that, in real mar-
kets, firms can seek “to concert action on a selective basis in rela-
tion to a one-off alteration in market conduct with reference simply 
to one parameter of competition,” though one may question if such 
thin coordination can effectively harm competition.110 
5. Raw Tobacco Italy 
In Raw Tobacco Italy, the Commission fined four processors of 
raw tobacco who had operated a buyer cartel to reduce the prices 
paid to farmers and intermediaries in Italy.111 The impugned con-
duct was garden-variety horizontal collusion, and included the joint 
fixing of purchase prices, a mechanism of allocation of suppliers 
and quantities and the exchange of confidential information.112 The 
case attracted a great deal of attention in practitioners’ circles, as it 
                                                                                                                            
105 See id. ¶ 19. 
106 Id. ¶ 39. 
107 Id. ¶ 37. Further, the facts showed that dealers’ remunerations were a “decisive 
factor in fixing the price to be paid by the end user.” Id. 
108 Id. ¶ 59. The parties remain entitled to try to rebut the presumption of 
anticompetitive effects. See id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. ¶ 60. The number of meetings is therefore irrelevant. See id. ¶ 61. 
111 Case COMP/C.38.281/B.2—Raw Tobacco Italy, Comm’n Decision, ¶ 1 (Oct. 20, 
2005) (Summary at 2006 (L 353) 45), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/ 
dec_docs/38281/38281_508_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/XBA7-BVVB]. 
112 Id. 
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was the first in which the Commission refused to grant immunity 
to a leniency applicant who had subsequently divulged details of its 
application to co-cartelists.113 On appeal, the EU court fully upheld 
the Commission’s analysis.114 
In addition to its buyer coordination aspects, the interest of this 
decision for this Article lies in another, relatively unnoticed as-
pect.115 In the course of the administrative proceedings, some de-
fendants attempted to justify some of their collusive activities on 
the ground that they had sought to “eliminate the power that in-
termediaries could enjoy on the basis of their illegal activities,” in-
cluding possibly “organi[z]ed crime” activity.116 Other raw tobacco 
processors argued that they intended to “establish a transparent 
auction system for the sale of tobacco which would have made the 
purchase of raw tobacco more efficient and significantly reduced 
the role of intermediaries.”117 
The Commission dismissed both justifications on legal 
grounds, paying no heed to the factual merits of the argument.118 In 
the Commission’s view: 
Serious infringements of [TFEU article [101(1)], 
such as those described in this Decision, cannot be 
justified by the aim to counteract third parties’ alle-
gedly illegal conduct. It is clearly not the task of un-
dertakings to take steps contrary to [TFEU article 
101(1)] to counteract [behavior] which, rightly or 
wrongly, they regard as illegal and/or contrary to 
their own interests.119 
                                                                                                                            
113 See Case T-12/06, Deltafina SpA v. Comm’n, 2011 E.C.R. II-05639, ¶¶ 43–46. 
114 See Case C-578/11 P, Deltafina SpA v. Comm’n, ¶ 95 (June 14, 2014), http://curia. 
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=153583&pageIndex=0&doclang=e
n&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=827012 [https://perma.cc/YF35-YMGA]. 
115 That aspect is in relation to buyer coordination in auctions with intermediaries. 
116 Case COMP/C.38.281/B.2, Raw Tobacco Italy, ¶ 287 & n.253. 
117 Id. ¶ 288. 
118 See id. ¶ 289. 
119 Id. 
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And the Commission went even further, mooting that such con-
duct could not even qualify for exemption under TFEU article 
101(3).120 
The point was not further discussed during the appeals that 
took place before the EU courts. However, the Commission’s rea-
soning in Raw Tobacco Italy is an explicit transposition of the estab-
lished case law of the EU courts in single firm conduct cases.121 In 
Hilti AG v. Commission of the European Communities, the GC ruled 
that a dominant firm cannot justify anticompetitive tying on 
grounds of a perceived necessity to ensure product safety, when 
specific laws and enforcement institutions exist to that effect.122 
B. Normative Implications 
All of the cases from this Article’s sample led the courts and 
the Commission to affirm antitrust liability under TFEU article 
101(1), and, in a majority of them, the impugned coordination was 
formally qualified as a “restriction by object.”123 In EU antitrust 
law, this is the closest one can come to the non-treaty notion of a 
“cartel.” Despite their differences, each of the cases conveys legal 
principles of relevance for the analysis of the changes introduced by 
the IEEE-SA revised patent policy under EU antitrust law. This 
section considers each in turn. 
                                                                                                                            
120 See id. ¶¶ 291–92 (“Had the processors genuinely intended to justify their [behavior] 
on sound economic and legal arguments, they should have invoked the application of 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty. In any event, there are no elements in the Commission’s file 
indicating that [TFEU article 101(3)] could apply to the infringements described in this 
Decision.”). 
121 The Commission’s decision makes an analogy with the TFEU article 102 case law in 
Hilti AG v. Commission of the European Communities, where the court held, in relation to a 
dominant firm that was trying to justify an alleged abusive tying, that: “[T]here are laws 
in the United Kingdom attaching penalties to the sale of dangerous products and to the 
use of misleading claims as to the characteristics of any product. There are also 
authorities vested with powers to enforce those laws. In those circumstances it is clearly 
not the task of an undertaking in a dominant position to take steps on its own initiative to 
eliminate products which, rightly or wrongly, it regards as dangerous or at least as inferior 
in quality to its own products.” Case T-30/89, Hilti AG v. Comm’n, 1991 E.C.R. II-1439, 
¶ 118. 
122 See id. ¶ 119. 
123 See supra Section II.A. 
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SCK and FNK suggests that a trade association can lawfully in-
troduce “reasonable rates” requirements.124 However, the ruling 
also shows that the introduction of rate-related requirements paves 
the way to the applicability of TFEU article 101(1), and the risk of 
antitrust liability increases gradually as the trade association under-
takes to give “substance” to rate-related requirements.125 In the 
case at hand, the Commission easily found antitrust liability in light 
of the direct coordination of trade association participants on quan-
titative rate levels (internal and recommended).126 But, this leaves 
open the question of whether indirect coordination on rate-setting 
factors or qualitative methodologies would have attracted antitrust 
liability. 
The answer to this question may be found in Dole Food.127 The 
facts quoted in the opinion and judgments suggest that “by object” 
restrictions occur when rivals coordinate their understanding of 
abstract, non-quantitative factors like the weather, holiday periods, 
and market trends, among other factors.128 In its decision, the 
Commission objected in general and abstract terms to coordination 
on “price setting factors,” which it defined as “factors influencing 
supply vs. demand.”129 The parties in the proceedings actually iro-
nized on this, noting that their coordination was referred in the in-
dustry as “radio banana.”130 
Dole Food is also important because it held that “pre-pricing” 
coordination suffices to trigger antitrust liability.131 In other words, 
remote coordination well ahead of market transactions is a source 
of TFEU article 101(1) exposure. T-Mobile Netherlands conveys a 
                                                                                                                            
124 See Joined Cases T-213/95 & T-18/96, Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf 
(SCK) and Federatie van Nederlandse Kraanbedrijven (FNK) v. Comm’n, 1997 E.C.R. 
II-1739, ¶ 159. 
125 Id. 
126 See id. 
127 Case T-588/08, Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Comm’n, (Mar. 14, 2013), http:// 
curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=134981&doclang=EN [https:// 
perma.cc/5GJE-RFZR]. 
128 Id. ¶ 255. 
129 See id. ¶¶ 294–95, 377. 
130 Id. ¶ 195. 
131 Id. ¶ 21. 
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similar teaching, in the sense that early, one-off coordination can be 
deemed a restriction of competition “by object.”132 
Third, Raw Tobacco Italy133 serves as a reminder that objective 
justifications are not in the cards when firms engage in “by object” 
restrictions. To be more accurate, Raw Tobacco Italy transposes the 
GC’s Hilti AG134 case law to the area of coordinated conduct. Un-
der Hilti AG, firms cannot justify anticompetitive conduct by the 
need to forestall the illegal behavior of others.135 In Hilti AG, the 
court emphasized that such justifications are not available when 
specific legal institutions and enforcement structures exist to re-
medy the illegality.136 In other words, this statement means that 
firms cannot resort to (unlawful) anticompetitive private ordering 
remedies like buyer coordination to curb (unlawful) anticompeti-
tive supplier conduct.137 In more mundane terms, it is not the role 
of firms to correct antitrust infringements through recourse to oth-
er antitrust infringement when specific regulatory institutions are 
in place. Two wrongs do not make a right in antitrust law. 
FEDETAB made the important point that nonbinding recom-
mendations issued by representative institutions can give rise to a 
restriction by object if they are endorsed by a sufficient number of 
member firms.138 In other words, the greater the number of indus-
try participants who decide to comply with the industry recom-
mendation, the greater the risk of antitrust exposure. 
Last, both T-Mobile Netherlands139 and Raw Tobacco Italy140 
show that restrictions of competition by object can also originate at 
                                                                                                                            
132 See Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Neth. BV v. Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit, 2009 E.C.R. I-04529, ¶¶ 60–61. 
133 Case COMP/C.38.281/B.2— Raw Tobacco Italy, Comm’n Decision (Oct. 20, 
2005) (Summary at 2006 (L 353) 45), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/ 
dec_docs/38281/38281_508_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/XBA7-BVVB]. 
134 Case T-30/89, Hilti AG v. Comm’n, 1991 E.C.R. II-1439. 
135 See id. ¶ 118. 
136 Id. ¶¶ 116–17. 
137 For a discussion on when commercial parties will employ private ordering, see 
generally Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive 
Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328 (2004). 
138 See Case IV/28.852, 29.127, 29.149—Fedetab, Comm’n Decision, 1978 O.J. (L 224) 
29, ¶¶ 120–23. 
139 See Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Neth. BV v. Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit, 2009 E.C.R. I-04529. 
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the buyer level. While this point is not the most spectacular, it is 
worth recalling, given the positive stance generally taken by anti-
trust policy toward buyer power. 
All in all, there is a credible claim to make that TFEU article 
101(1) prohibits, as a restriction by object, any coordinated interfe-
rence with the price system. This strict legal regime is not unprec-
edented. It shares many similarities with the “rigid” situation that 
prevailed in U.S. antitrust law after the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1940 
ruling in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.141 In this case, the 
Supreme Court wrote in dicta that the Sherman Act condemned 
any combination which tampers with the price system.142 The 
Court wrote: 
Any combination which tampers with price structures is 
engaged in an unlawful activity. Even though the 
members of the price-fixing group were in no posi-
tion to control the market, to the extent that they 
raised, lowered, or stabilized prices they would be di-
rectly interfering with the free play of market forces. 
The Act places all such schemes beyond the pale 
and protects that vital part of our economy against 
any degree of interference. Congress has not left 
with us the determination of whether or not particu-
lar price-fixing schemes are wise or unwise, healthy 
or destructive. It has not permitted the age-old cry 
of ruinous competition and competitive evils to be a 
defense to price-fixing conspiracies. It has no more 
allowed genuine or fancied competitive abuses as a 
legal justification for such schemes than it has the 
good intentions of the members of the combina-
tion.143 
                                                                                                                            
140 See Case COMP/C.38.281/B.2—Raw Tobacco Italy, Comm’n Decision (Oct. 20, 
2005) (Summary at 2006 (L 353) 45), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/ 
dec_docs/38281/38281_508_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/XBA7-BVVB]. 
141 310 U.S. 150 (1940); see also ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, 
ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 183–84 (4th ed. 1994). 
142 Socony, 310 U.S. at 221. 
143 Id. at 221–22 (emphasis added). 
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Since then, courts have relaxed the Socony case law,144 but it is 
interesting to note that no similar evolution—with anecdotal ex-
ceptions—seems to have taken place in EU competition law.145 In 
contrast, in close intellectual proximity with the Supreme Court of 
the 1940s, the EU courts have built an edifice of case law that 
seems to repute as unlawful and a restriction by object any coordi-
nation that interferes with the free market price system. 
Even the celebrated CJEU judgment in the 2014 case Groupe-
ment des Cartes Bancaires v. European Commission,146 which put an 
                                                                                                                            
144 Most commentators underline that Socony remains good law, yet they stress that the 
Supreme Court has practically brought derogations by permitting defendants to raise rule 
of reason type arguments. See, e.g., GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 141, at 195 (“Since 
the late 1970s, with the notable exception of Maricopa, the Court’s horizontal pricing 
jurisprudence has demonstrated a willingness to modify the traditional per se/rule of 
reason dichotomy. At a minimum, BMI and NCAA authorize courts to expand the 
characterization component of the traditional per se standard and explicitly entertain a 
fuller assessment of defendants’ claims that the price-setting behavior has nontrivial 
procompetitive merit.”); see also In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 703 F.3d 1004, 1012 
(7th Cir. 2012) (“The plaintiffs retreat to the general language in the Socony-Vacuum 
opinion, an opinion 72 years old and showing its age.”). Judge Posner proceeded to 
examine the many relaxations brought to Socony by the Supreme Court’s case law. See id. 
at 1012–14. 
145 See, e.g., Case C-35/99, Arduino, 2002 E.C.R. I-1529, ¶¶ 37–38. In Arduino, for 
instance, the court accepted the idea that the “public interest” may justify the fixing of 
minimum and maximum prices by bar associations. Id. Further, even though this aging 
case law has only been rarely applied, it is also true that the court has never taken steps to 
reverse it and has occasionally referred to it in subsequent cases. Moreover, the recent 
case law of the EU courts suggests that some coordinated interferences with the price 
system deserve to be treated under the rule of reason. In the 2014 judgment in 
MasterCard, Inc. v. European Commission, the CJEU found that the multilateral 
interchange fees (“MIFs”) collectively set by the MasterCard payment system were 
problematic because they reduced “the possibility of prices [for merchants] dropping 
below a certain threshold.” Case C-382/12 P, MasterCard, Inc. v. Comm’n, ¶ 193 (Sept. 
11, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=157521& 
pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=832893 [https:// 
perma.cc/JCV3-ZSZD]. Like the GC in MasterCard, however, the court scrutinized this 
price interference under the rule of reason. See C-382/12 P, MasterCard, ¶ 129 (citing 
Case T-111/08, MasterCard, Inc. v. Comm’n, ¶¶ 143, 163–164 (May 24, 2012), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid= 
123081&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=833704 
[https://perma.cc/XJD2-AHSG]. The court did not use the “restriction by object” 
framework applied in other contemporary cases of coordinated interferences with the 
price system. Id. 
146 See Case C-67/13 P, Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v. Comm’n, ¶ 58 (Sept. 11, 
2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=157516& 
238          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:211 
 
end to the open-ended interpretation of the notion of a restriction 
by object, is compatible with this Article’s understanding of the 
case law. Admittedly, the strict liability rule applied to coordination 
that tampers with the price system fits the Cartes Bancaires re-
stricted scope requirement whereby the notion of restriction of 
competition by object “can be applied only to certain types of coordi-
nation between undertakings which reveal a sufficient degree of 
harm to competition,” so long as the court views such interfe-
rences with the price system as the supreme evil of antitrust.147 
To conclude, this Article notes that its interpretation of coor-
dinated interference with the price system as a restriction by object 
also seems to be the Commission’s understanding. In a not so dis-
tant past the Commission held that railway companies active in the 
“International Railways Union” had restricted competition by 
jointly defining provisions “on the structure of sales prices” for rail 
haulage and the “methods for determining such prices.”148 Even 
though the price “structure established by the railway companies 
[did] not directly concern haulage prices,” it nevertheless had “an 
indirect effect on tariff levels.”149 
C. Applied Analysis 
At the outset, it seems uncontroversial to consider that the 
IEEE-SA revised patent policy can be analogized to a price recom-
mendation by an industry association, likely to trigger the applica-
bility of TFEU article 101(1). However, at a deeper level of analy-
sis, the definition of “reasonable rates” and the three factors listed 
in the policy150 seem to constitute an attempt to “give substance” 
to the content of the IEEE-SA’s FRAND commitment, which 
                                                                                                                            
pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=834032 [https:// 
perma.cc/ART3-VKH9] (“The concept of restriction of competition ‘by object’ can be 
applied only to certain types of coordination between undertakings which reveal a 
sufficient degree of harm to competition that it may be found that there is no need to 
examine their effects . . . .”). 
147 Id. (emphasis added). 
148 See Case IV/34.494—Tariff Structures in the Combined Transport of Goods, 
Comm’n Decision 1993 O.J. (L 73) 38, ¶¶ 11, 24. 
149 Id. ¶ 25. The Commission accepted to exempt the agreement on the basis of a sector 
specific legislative immunity that reinstated the applicability of article 101(3) TFEU. See 
Council Regulation (EEC) 1017/68, 1968 O.J. (L 175) 1. 
150 IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, supra note 1, at 2. 
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gradually raises the risk of antitrust liability along the lines de-
scribed in SCK and FCK.151 This is confirmed in the letter ad-
dressed by IEEE-SA to the DOJ in support of its request, which is 
rife with references to the revised patent policy’s goal to “provide 
greater clarity.”152 
In addition, the fact that neither the concept of a reasonable 
rate nor the three factors are given quantitative content is not suffi-
cient to defuse the risk of antitrust liability, as clearly shown in Dole 
Food.153 This point seemed critical in the DOJ assessment, which 
noted that the revised patent policy did not impose “any specific 
royalty calculation methodology.”154 In contrast, in EU antitrust 
law, a shared understanding on mere pricing “considerations” 
seems to merit severe antitrust scrutiny under article 101(1) 
TFEU.155 
A similar analysis applies to the fact that the actual definition of 
licensing rates is “left to parties’ negotiations.”156 In its BRL, the 
DOJ dismissed concerns of antitrust harm as “unlikely to occur as 
a result of the [u]pdate given that, inter alia, licensing rates ulti-
mately are determined through bilateral negotiations . . . .”157 As 
seen above, EU antitrust law finds antitrust liability by object, even 
if the coordination is too remote from market transactions to entitle 
the parties to control the market price.158 In reality, mere interfe-
rence with the free market price system seems to be a sufficient 
                                                                                                                            
151 See generally Joined Cases T-213/95 & T-18/96, Stichting Certificatie 
Kraanverhuurbedrijf (SCK) and Federatie van Nederlandse Kraanbedrijven (FNK) v. 
Comm’n, 1997 E.C.R. II-1739. 
152 See Request, supra note 14, at 15, 18; see also Karachalios, supra note 15, at 6. 
153 See Case C-286/13 P, Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Comm’n (Mar. 19, 2015), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=163028&pageIndex=
0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=684009 [https://perma.cc/ 
NL9M-Y6K2]. 
154 See BRL, supra note 2, at 12. 
155 See supra Section II.A. The concept of other considerations in determining 
“reasonable rates” is discussed in question 47 of the IEEE-SA’s FAQs. See 
Understanding Patent Issues, supra note 13, at 15. Such coordination falls squarely within 
the notion of “price setting factors” described in the Commission’s decision. See supra 
Section II.A.3. 
156 See Request, supra note 14, at 16. 
157 See BRL, supra note 2, at 8. 
158 See supra Sections II.A.3–4. 
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concern to trigger a finding of restriction by object under TFEU 
article 101(1). 
Last, the contention that the IEEE-SA revised patent policy is 
optional and can be disregarded by standards participants was per-
haps relevant in the DOJ analysis, but has little significance from an 
EU antitrust standpoint.159 As FEDETAB makes abundantly clear, 
it is sufficient that the recommendation receives substantial en-
dorsement from market participants.160 On the facts, this is mani-
festly the case, otherwise the policy would have never attracted a 
majority of votes within the IEEE-SA governing bodies. Further, 
the IEEE-SA website confirms that several large firms such as 
Broadcom, Intel, and Samsung have already issued LOAs that were 
deemed to comply with the revised patent policy.161 
All this notwithstanding, this Article’s reasoning could be criti-
cized on the ground that several of the cases cited concern secret 
and direct communication between firms over pre-pricing factors, 
and not public and indirect pricing recommendations within the 
formal framework of a trade association. However, this objection is 
not fatal. When a trade association declares that members A, B, and 
C shall apply pricing principles X and Y, it is the same as having 
market rivals A and B, and B and C, enter into secret contact to 
agree that they will apply pricing principles X and Y. 
In sum, the rulings of the EU courts point to an unlawful re-
striction by object when an industry association remotely recom-
mends the application of qualitative pricing factors in future market 
transactions.162 This suggests that the optimistic findings reached 
by the BRL under U.S. antitrust law standards would not be ex-
portable if the IEEE-SA revised patent policy were to be scruti-
nized under EU antitrust law. The reason for this is not a matter of 
                                                                                                                            
159 Patent holders may refuse to issue a LOA or to select the FRAND box on the LOA 
form. 
160 See Joined Cases 209 to 215 & 218/78, Heintz van Landewyck SARL v. Comm’n, 
1980 E.C.R. 3125, ¶ 89. 
161 These letters can be found on the IEEE-SA website. See IEEE-SA Records of IEEE 
Standards-Related Patent Letters of Assurance for IEEE Standards 802–802.1 and 
Amendments, IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD: PATCOM, https://standards.ieee.org/about/ 
sasb/patcom/pat802.html [https://perma.cc/692F-64VC] (last visited Nov. 22, 2016). 
162 Also, the possible justification to avert otherwise unlawful anticompetitive conduct 
is not available. 
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facts, but law. In the EU, a cartel-type prohibition rule applies to 
any coordination that interferes with the price system.163 
Beyond IEEE-SA, the case law of the EU courts more generally 
creates a serious risk of antitrust exposure for SSOs that contem-
plate similar changes to their patent policy. To be sure, the argu-
ment here is not that EU antitrust agencies would—let alone 
should—take action against SSOs patent policies for infringement 
of TFEU article 101,164 or that the EU antitrust agencies would not 
use their margin of discretion to dismiss complaints against SSOs, 
settle such cases, or extend the benefit of an exemption under 
TFEU article 101(3). On the contrary, major world antitrust agen-
cies have generally cast a favorable eye on such changes. In 2006, 
the DOJ issued a BRL, finding no need to challenge VMEbus In-
ternational Trade Association’s (“VITA”) new patent policy, 
which prescribed a commitment by working group members to dec-
lare “the maximum royalty rates and most restrictive non-royalty 
terms.”165 In 2010, the Commission took exactly the same position 
in its guidelines on horizontal cooperation agreements.166 The 
                                                                                                                            
163 And this holds true regardless of its remoteness, ineffectiveness, or whether it is 
excusable. See Case T-588/08, Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Comm’n, ¶ 653 (Mar. 14, 2013), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=134981&doclang=EN 
[https://perma.cc/5GJE-RFZR]. 
164 An interesting and thought-provoking question would be to determine whether a 
standards participant could apply to the Commission for immunity under the leniency 
notice. 
165 See Letter from Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Robert A. Skitol, Drinker, Biddle & Reath LLP (Oct. 30, 2006) [hereinafter VITA BRL] 
(on file with the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal). 
VITA requested a business review letter from the U.S. DOJ. See Letter from Robert A. 
Skitol & Kenneth M. Vorrasi, Drinker, Biddle & Reath LLP, to Thomas O. Barnett, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (June 15, 2006) (on file with the Fordham 
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal). The DOJ recalled the 
procompetitive effects of collaborative standard-setting processes. See VITA BRL, supra, 
at 7. It noted the potential of standard setting to generate exclusionary and collusive 
effects, which could be found to harm competition. Id. In light of this, the DOJ undertook 
an analysis of the new patent policy under the rule of reason. Id. at 8. The DOJ eventually 
issued the business review letter finding no cause for antitrust concern. Id. at 10. It 
nonetheless called VITA, the VITA Standards Organization, and its member companies 
“vigilantly to continue to educate working group participants about the severe 
consequences of such activities.” Id. 
166 See Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101, supra note 57, ¶ 299 (“[S]hould a 
standard-setting organi[z]ation’s [intellectual property rights] policy choose to provide 
for [intellectual property rights] holders to individually disclose their most restrictive 
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Commission additionally stated in a footnote that, in its view, the 
prohibition of TFEU article 101 did not prevent IPR holders to in-
dividually take “the decision to license [intellectual property 
rights] essential to a standard on royalty-free terms;”167 though this 
statement of forbearance came with the caveat that this “should 
not serve as a cover to jointly fix prices either of downstream prod-
ucts or of substitute [intellectual property rights]/technologies.”168 
Instead, this Article’s point is that regardless of the policy pre-
ferences expressed by antitrust agencies, changes of the kind intro-
duced by the IEEE-SA should be given serious consideration under 
the case law adopted pursuant to TFEU article 101. Courts and ar-
bitration tribunals dealing with patent infringement cases, patent 
damages litigation, or rate-setting proceedings could indeed be 
faced with a new form of competition defense (or counter-defense), 
raised by SEP holders who do not comply with an SSO’s patent 
policy—e.g., a SEP holder requests royalties that reflect the added 
value of the end product—to avoid the consummation of an unlaw-
ful restriction of competition by object within the meaning of 
TFEU article 101. For example, an unlicensed implementer subject 
to injunction proceedings may argue in defense that the SEP owner 
has violated the IEEE-SA patent policy by bringing infringement 
proceedings following the failure of negotiations based on a pro-
posed rate that is unreasonable in view of the new definition. A 
possible counter-defense by the SEP owner could be that the IEEE-
SA definition of “reasonable rates” in not enforceable, given its 
contrariety with TFEU article 101. 
Interestingly, the risk of violation of TFEU article 101(1)  could 
also offer a retrospective explanation for the CJEU’s conservative 
ruling in Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp.169 In his opinion 
                                                                                                                            
licensing terms, including the maximum royalty rates they would charge, prior to the 
adoption of the standard, this will normally not lead to a restriction of competition within 
the meaning of [a]rticle 101(1).”). 
167 Id. ¶ 274 n.109. 
168 Id. ¶ 299 n.124. In other words, the decision to license on royalty-free terms shall 
remain individual, and firms shall not jointly decide that licensing must take place on a 
royalty-free basis. 
169 See Case C-170/13, Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp., ¶ 77 (July 16, 2015), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=165911&pageIndex=
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to the court, Advocate General Wathelet suggested that the court 
invite SSOs “to establish minimum conditions or a framework of 
‘rules of good conduct’ for the negotiation of FRAND licensing 
terms.”170 In its judgment, the CJEU did not follow the invitation, 
possibly in light of the inconsistency between such a pronounce-
ment and the court’s case law under TFEU article 101(1).171 
In sum, in the United States, the main antitrust concern that 
scholars have leveled at the IEEE-SA revised patent policy is one of 
buyer collusion. In the European Union, a less facts-dependent 
standard of liability applies, with the result that the risk of antitrust 
liability under European law is considerably higher for SSOs that 
consider changes of the kind introduced by the IEEE-SA revised 
patent policy. 
III. RATIONALE: INCIPIENCY THEORY 
EU competition law brings any coordinated interference with 
the price system under a quasi per se prohibition rule, similar to the 
standard of liability applied in cartel cases under U.S. law. Perhaps 
no other case conveys this philosophy better than the Dole Food de-
cision, where the fact that the impugned coordination had “an in-
fluence on supply vis-à-vis demand” was deemed sufficient to find 
a restriction by object.172 
This strict legal standard is presumably based on deeper legal 
and economic considerations. Unfortunately, however, the CJEU 
                                                                                                                            
0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=51500 [https://perma.cc/G8SG-
ELT6]. 
170 See Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp., 
C-170/13 ¶ 11 (Nov, 20, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf? 
docid=159827&doclang=EN [https://perma.cc/FVY2-C28S]. The opinion further 
continued: “Without these, not only actions for a prohibitory injunction but also the rules 
on abuse of a dominant position, which should be employed only as solutions of last 
resort, are being used as a negotiating tool or a means of leverage by the SEP-holder or the 
undertaking which implements the standard and uses the teaching protected by that 
SEP.” Id. 
171 See Case C-170/13, Huawei, ¶ 77. 
172 Case C-286/13 P, Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Comm’n, ¶¶ 97, 107 (Mar. 19, 2015), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=163028&pageIndex=
0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=684009 [https://perma.cc/ 
NL9M-Y6K2]. 
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has not explicitly elaborated the intellectual roots of this strict re-
gime, in line with its customary practice of stating what the law is, 
without articulating why this law is justified.173 In this Article’s 
view, a plausible foundation for the EU courts’ strict regime is the 
“incipiency theory” which, again, can be traced to early U.S. anti-
trust law.174 Under the incipiency theory, the antitrust structure 
should seek to arrest anticompetitive conduct in its incipiency, be-
fore it expands into a full-fledged restriction of competition.175 As 
U.S. antitrust experts Robert H. Bork and Ward S. Bowman once 
colorfully explained in relation to U.S. antitrust law, the theory is 
based on the “idea that it is possible to nip restraints of trade and 
monopolies in the bud before they blossom to Sherman Act propor-
tions.”176 Put differently, the incipiency theory seeks to provide an 
anticipative remedy for conduct that presents a “dangerous likelih-
ood” of anticompetitive infringement if and when “fully 
grown.”177 The incipiency theory does not catch only finite forms 
of conduct that are yet to produce anticompetitive effects, but also 
infinite forms of conduct that pose an even more distant threat to 
competition.178 The foundations of this extraordinarily precautio-
nary enforcement theory are still discussed in modern antitrust 
scholarship.179 Some rationalize it on economic grounds, consider-
ing that incipiency is designed for cases of firm conduct that kno-
wingly yields a “dangerous probability” of anticompetitive ef-
                                                                                                                            
173 This can be described as “it-is-so-because-we-say-so” jurisprudence. See Webster v. 
Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 552 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
174 See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
175 See Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 
363, 368 (1965). 
176 Id. For a critique, see Olivier E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The 
Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 27 (1968) (noting that “while Bork and 
Bowman may be correct in charging that scale economy justifications have not been given 
sufficient weight in the recent enforcement of the merger law, they are also guilty of a 
certain heavy-handedness in their own treatment of the incipiency question”). 
177 See Jesse W. Markham, Lessons for Competition Law from the Economic Crisis: The 
Prospect for Antitrust Responses to the “Too-Big-to-Fail” Phenomenon, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. 
& FIN. L., 261, 295 (2011). 
178 See Thomas Dahdouh, Section 5, the FTC and Its Critics: Just Who Are the Radicals 
Here?, 20 COMPETITION: J. ANTITRUST & UNFAIR COMPETITION L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 1, 14 
(2011). 
179 See, e.g., id. 
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fects.180 Others argue that incipiency is justified in all cases of firm 
conduct that challenges the political objectives of antitrust law 
(preservation of a self-policing system, individual freedom, etc.).181 
The incipiency theory is the bedrock of several U.S. antitrust 
statutes including section 7 of the Clayton Act182 and the Celler Ke-
fauver Act, which set out a merger control system;183 section 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act, which outlaws trade restraints 
that threaten to become a Sherman Act violation;184 and section 2 
of the Sherman Act, which declares unlawful attempted monopoli-
zation.185 Some authors actually refer to those pieces of legislation 
as the “incipiency statutes.”186 
The incipiency theory has also been influential in U.S. case law. 
In a series of cases, U.S. courts have relied on incipiency theory to 
extend antitrust liability to conduct with benign anticompetitive 
potential. The incipiency theory is, in particular, the foundation of 
a controversial line of opinions where the Supreme Court enjoined 
mergers with limited market coverage.187 It is also the theoretical 
                                                                                                                            
180 See Markham, supra note 177, at 295 (“Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to 
produce a result which the law seeks to prevent—for instance, the monopoly—but 
require further acts in addition to the mere forces of nature to bring that result to pass, an 
intent to bring it to pass is necessary in order to produce a dangerous probability that it 
will happen. But when that intent and the consequent dangerous probability exist, this 
statute, like many others and like the common law in some cases, directs itself against that 
dangerous probability as well as against the completed result.” (citation omitted) (citing 
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905))). 
181 See Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 
377, 382–83 (1965); Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 
U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 525. 
182 See Steven C. Salop, Symposium on Mergers and Antitrust, 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4 
(1987); Note, “Preliminary Preliminary” Relief Against Anticompetitive Mergers, 82 YALE 
L.J. 155, 170 (1972). 
183 See Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1225 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012)); Stucke, supra note 181, at 525 (“Seeking, 
with mixed results, to break up the German cartels, the United States after World War II 
domestically strengthened its merger laws to arrest concentration of economic might in 
its incipiency.”). 
184 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012); see also Luca Fiorito, When Economics Faces the Economy: John 
Bates Clark and the 1914 Antitrust Legislation, 25 REV. POL. ECON. 139, 159 (2013). 
185 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
186 See, e.g., Markham, supra note 177, at 296. 
187 See United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 304 (1966); United States v. 
Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362–63 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 
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backbone of the case law that affirms a per se prohibition rule 
against all cartels, including those that are ineffective at affecting 
market conditions due to lack of market power. Law professors 
Harlan M. Blake and William K. Jones explained that, in those cas-
es, the courts acted on the “supposition that an ineffective cartel 
would eventually correct its mistakes and expand its efforts to em-
brace or crush any troublesome outside competition.”188 Finally, 
the incipiency theory has also inspired the—now reversed—per se 
prohibition of resale price maintenance, by analogy to horizontal 
price-fixing agreements, but without proof of market control.189 
In modern U.S. antitrust law, the influence of the incipiency 
doctrine in the case law has receded. Amongst others, progress in 
economic theory throughout the twentieth century has weakened 
the early consensus that ascribed deleterious effects to a wide range 
of business practices.190 This openness to economic reasoning is 
what presumably motivated the Supreme Court to overrule the in-
                                                                                                                            
U.S. 294, 346 (1962); see also Robert H. Lande, Resurrecting Incipiency: From Von’s 
Grocery to Consumer Choice, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 875 (2001). 
188 See Blake & Jones, supra note 181, at 386. However, this is disputed. See Robert H. 
Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: I, 65 COLUM. L. REV., 401, 414 n.16 (1965). 
189 Blake & Jones, supra note 181, at 386 n.32; see also Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. 
Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 384–85 (1911), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prod., 
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). In Dr. Miles, the Court wrote: 
As to this, the complainant can fare no better with its plan of identical 
contracts than could the dealers themselves if they formed a 
combination and endeavored to establish the same restrictions, and 
thus to achieve the same result, by agreement with each other. If the 
immediate advantage they would thus obtain would not be sufficient 
to sustain such a direct agreement, the asserted ulterior benefit to the 
complainant cannot be regarded as sufficient to support its system. 
But agreements or combinations between dealers, having for their 
sole purpose the destruction of competition and the fixing of prices, 
are injurious to the public interest and void. They are not saved by the 
advantages which the participants expect to derive from the enhanced 
price to the consumer. . . . The complainant’s plan falls within the 
principle which condemns contracts of this class. It, in effect, creates 
a combination for the prohibited purposes. No distinction can 
properly be made by reason of the particular character of the 
commodity in question.  
See id. 
190 See Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern 
Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 733, 734 (2012). 
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cipiency treatment of resale price maintenance in Leegin Creative 
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 
To be sure, the incipiency statutes remain in force. But when 
they are applied, agencies and courts embrace an effects-based ap-
proach, which gauges prospective risks of consumer harm on a 
case-by-case basis.191 Even the per se prohibition rule on price-
fixing192 has given way to a structured analysis, whereby price-
fixing is no longer prohibited on its face, but is subject to a “quick 
look” examination of the relevant facts which determines its sub-
sequent treatment under the law.193 As the Supreme Court noted in 
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., “[w]hen 
two partners set the price of their goods or services they are literal-
ly ‘price fixing,’ but they are not per se in violation of the Sherman 
Act.”194 
Against this background, the incipiency theory could be the 
implicit rationale that underpins the strict case law of the EU 
courts in relation to remote, indirect and peripheral interferences 
with the price system.195 This interpretation acknowledges that 
coordinated interferences with the price system may not be pre-
sently anticompetitive, but that they, nonetheless, deserve to be 
prohibited on the ground that they move participating firms one 
step closer to unlawful price coordination (and one step away from 
independent competitive pricing). 
The case law of the EU courts under TFEU article 101(1) lends 
itself quite well to an incipiency theory reading. The per se prohibi-
tion of isolated coordination in T-Mobile Netherlands196 can be ra-
tionalized on the ground of the need to attack collusion in its infan-
cy. Similarly, the finding of an infringement for unlawful pre-
                                                                                                                            
191 David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty, and Stability in Antitrust Law, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729, 749 (2001). 
192 See Louis Kaplow, On The Meaning of Horizontal Agreement in Competition Law, 99 
CALIF. L. REV. 683, 683 (2011). 
193 See Gavil, supra note 190, at 751. 
194 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979). 
195 See Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. 
U. L. REV. 281, 281 (1956). 
196 See Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Neth. BV v. Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit, 2009 E.C.R. I-04529. 
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pricing communications in Dole Food197 shares the same spirit. Fi-
nally, the spectacular reversal of the case law on de minimis restric-
tions of competition in Expedia Inc. v. Autorite ́ de la concurrence may 
be reasoned on the basis of incipiency theory.198 In Expedia, the 
CJEU affirmed dicta that restrictions by object were presumed to 
appreciably affect competition,199 reversing a decades old 
precedent and discarding the laxer principle affirmed in the Com-
mission’s 2001 de minimis notice.200 In the court’s view, a price 
fixing arrangement covering two percent of a market is “by its na-
ture and independently of any concrete effect” an “appreciable 
restriction on competition.”201 
Pushing the incipiency hypothesis further, two declinations of 
the theory can be potentially envisioned. On the one hand, coordi-
nated interference with the price system may be looked at as a first 
stage, preliminary measure that forms part of a larger plan to cartel-
ize an industry. This ties in with eighteenth century classical econ-
omist Adam Smith’s famous quote: “People of the same trade sel-
dom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the con-
versation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some con-
trivance to raise prices.”202 In this hypothesis, the narrative is that 
rivals that initially cooperate may be naturally and irremediably 
brought to adopt additional anticompetitive arrangements. 
On the other hand, coordinated conduct that interferes with the 
price system may be seen as a facilitating device or plus factor, 
which raises risks of tacit collusion amongst interdependent oligo-
                                                                                                                            
197 See C-286/13 P, Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Comm’n, ¶ 1 (Mar. 19, 2015), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=163028&pageIndex=
0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=684009 [https://perma.cc/ 
NL9M-Y6K2]. 
198 Case C-226/11, Expedia, Inc. v. Autorité de la concurrence, ¶ 36 (Dec. 13, 2012), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=131804&pageIndex=
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200 Id. ¶ 38. This precedent is Case C-5/69, Franz Volk v. S.P.R.L. Ets J. Vervaecke, 
1969 E.C.R. I-00295. 
201 Case 226/11, Expedia, ¶ 37. 
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NATIONS 145 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press ed. 1976). 
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polists through, for instance, a reduction of market uncertainty. In 
this variant, the narrative is economic, and it focuses on a pre-
sumed risk of anticompetitive effects that stems from the facilitat-
ing device. 
On a cursory analysis, both narratives could explain the classifi-
cation of the IEEE-SA revised patent policy as a restriction by ob-
ject. First, one can recall that the IEEE-SA changed its patent poli-
cy in 2007 in order to entitle patent holders to disclose their pro-
posed maximum rates and other terms.203 As admitted by IEEE-SA 
in its request for a BRL, it is precisely the failure of this policy that 
prompted the SSO to adopt a revised patent policy in 2015 which 
sets up a more comprehensive system.204 This evolution fits well 
with the Smithian incipiency theory narrative, which encapsulates 
the—gloomy—conjecture that any competitor coordination is 
doomed to progress towards price fixing.205 Second, the various 
documents adopted by the IEEE-SA to explain its revised patent 
policy focus on the avowed aim of providing “clarification” and 
resolving an alleged problem of “uncertainty.”206 Given that par-
ticipants in IEEE-SA working groups are also often rival oligopol-
ists in manufacturing markets, it is not wholly heretical to adopt a 
rule that finds antitrust liability for measures that increase transpa-
rency in concentrated markets, though it may be overly crude to 
use the “restriction by object” approach.207 
At this stage of the discussion, Dole Food208 is again useful, be-
cause it provides hints on which of the two incipiency narratives 
does not drive the case law interpreting TFEU article 101(1). The 
facts discussed by the Commission and the EU courts reveal that 
the quotation prices on which the impugned pre-pricing communi-
cations took place were “not closely correlated” with actual trans-
                                                                                                                            
203 See Request, supra note 14, at 10. 
204 See id. 
205 See SMITH, supra note 202. 
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207 See generally Nicolas Petit, The Oligopoly Problem in EU Competition Law, in 
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action prices.209 Moreover, the existence of import quotas on bana-
nas limited the parties’ ability to influence the total quantities sup-
plied in the EU, and in turn, their power to raise prices.210 Those 
facts suggest that the parties’ pre-pricing communications on quo-
tation prices were quite unlikely to ever “ripen” into anticompeti-
tive coordination.211 While it treated the conduct as a restriction by 
object, the Commission explicitly acknowledged this by granting a 
sixty percent reduction on the fine inflicted to the parties: 
The fact that during the relevant period the banana 
sector was subject to a very specific regulatory re-
gime is taken into consideration, in [favor] of all the 
parties, as a mitigating circumstance as well as that 
the coordination related to the quotation prices. In 
light of the very particular circumstances of this 
case, a reduction of [sixty percent] is applied to the 
basic amount of the fines for all the parties.212 
The Commission’s leniency vis-à-vis a restriction by object im-
plicitly means that the pre-pricing communications were not 
treated as an incipient infringement because of the economic risk 
that they would facilitate collusive pricing. Instead, the incipiency 
theory that possibly underpins the court’s case law may be closer to 
the Smithian narrative which proposes to outlaw competitor coop-
eration on price in the cradle, before it grows into plain vanilla 
price fixing. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article argues that the evolution of the general EU anti-
trust case law on horizontal coordination under TFEU article 101 
creates a risk of antitrust liability for SSO policies that attempt to 
give substance to the concept of reasonable rates and guidelines on 
                                                                                                                            
209 See id. ¶ 432 (noting that “the Commission recogni[z]es itself quotation prices are 
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210 See id. ¶ 301. 
211 For use of the word, see Ward S. Bowman Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage 
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rate-setting factors. The intellectual foundation of this may be a 
belief by the EU courts that, in a market economy, the free market 
price system must remain untouched. Accordingly, the TFEU ar-
ticle 101 case law treats as a “restriction by object” any coordina-
tion that tampers with the price system.213 In practice, coordinated 
conduct is thus deemed on its face to be incompatible with the first 
paragraph of TFEU article 101,214 and unlikely to benefit from an 
exemption under the third paragraph of TFEU article 101. 
While SSOs should not be too worried about the risk of anti-
trust enforcement by the EU Commission or other national compe-
tition agencies in light of their stated policy preferences, SSOs 
should nonetheless remain cautious. Due to the direct effect of the 
EU competition rules, national courts involved in patent litigation 
may be called upon to assess the validity of SSOs’ patent policies 
under TFEU article 101. And in this context, the policy prefe-
rences expressed by antitrust agencies occupy little, if no, place in 
the assessment. 
In the past decade, antitrust agencies have repeatedly invited 
SSOs to define and clarify the meaning of FRAND commit-
ments.215 In light of the EU courts’ case law, those invitations may 
have counterintuitively created an antitrust trap for SSOs. In brief, 
while SSOs initiatives to refine their patent policies will certainly 
be viewed with sympathy by some antitrust agencies outside of Eu-
rope—as the DOJ BRL shows—they may trigger findings of anti-
trust liability in the courts of the old continent. 
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